The Challenge
Spoonlabs runs live audio and short-form video platforms with an engineering estate that grew the way successful products do: quickly, across more than one code host, more than one cloud, and a set of collaboration tools that everyone writes into.
That shape is what makes machine-identity risk hard. A credential pasted into a ticket, committed to a repository years ago, or left in a storage bucket is not visible from any single tool. The question was never whether something had been left behind. It was where, and which of it still worked.
The Solution
The proof of concept connected six source types: object storage, two code hosts, an issue tracker, a wiki, and a messaging workspace. The code-host connectors can inspect available commit history, where a removed string may still be present. Other connected sources are scanned according to their own access and history limits. Cremit checked validity with the issuer for supported credential types; other matches still required human review.
The Results
Over eight days, the team brought finding locations and available validity results into one investigation. Supported AWS and GCP key types can also carry access context, which helps set review order; a finding alone does not establish every permission or prove misuse. The historical scan was still running when the evaluation ended, so the case does not claim complete coverage of all six connected sources.